Introduction: The release of biohazardous agents could affect many people. Preparedness is crucial for adequate responses to accidental or deliberate release of biohazardous agents. It is believed that exercises based on simulated incident scenes are effective methods for the training of firefighters and biohazard response teams. Structured evaluations are important methods used to identify areas of ineffectiveness and to assure the quality of responses to releases of biohazards. Methods: A local fire department conducted a full-scale biohazard exercise in an elementary school. The firefighters practiced prohibiting entry to the area, establishing security zones, evacuating victims, assessing hazards, preventing further dissemination, and sampling and keeping the suspicious material in safe custody. Trained observers systematically evaluated the exercise following a standardized evaluation protocol. A set of data collection templates were created based on standard operating procedures extracted from current guidelines. Results: There were 60 firefighters, eight members of the incident command, 16 simulated victims, and 18 trained observers that participated in the exercise. Out of 31 standard operating procedures, 20 were in accordance with the guidelines, 10 were performed incorrectly, and one was not applicable. Major problems related to the assessment and handling of the suspicious material, the use of protective equipment, and decontamination of victims. Reasons for incomplete and/or conflicting documentation included insufficient knowledge and training of observers, imprecise instructions about documentation, and the size of observation zones. Conclusions: Intensive education and training of response activities is necessary. Each fire department should perpetually reassess their technical equipment and specific skills and their communication and command structures. The applied documentation system performed well in disclosing discrepancies between observed response activities and current recommendations. Using external observers provided transparent and independent data. However, intensive observer training is necessary. Observer training should include detailed, written instructions and short guidelines that could be available during the exercise. 
Introduction
In recent years, the threat posed by bioterrorism has aroused public and political interest. Though accidental or deliberate release of biohazardous materials have been rare in Germany, the threat is present. The releases of biological biohazardous agents could affect many people. In 2002, the German Ministry of the Interior commissioned the development of an expertise on preparedness. 1 Subsequently, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance 2 (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK)) and the Center for Biological Safety 3 (Zentrum für Biologische Sicherheit Response to the Release of Biohazardous Agents both guidelines (Table 1) . A total of 31 items defined the operational skills required for an adequate response. Since appropriateness and efficiency of victim rescue, staff safety, and pollution containment are the most relevant in biohazard response, 4, 5 this evaluation primarily focused on these activities.
Data Collection
The data collection followed the standardized protocol outlined in Figure 1 . A set of data collection templates was created based upon the reference list of SOPs. Since observers were to be located in different areas of the exercise, the data collection templates were tailored to area-specific response activities.
Each area of the incident scene requires specific response activities. The incident command (fire department) established three main security zones (Figures 1 and 2 ) according to the degree of contamination (black zone = contaminated environment; grey zone = security zone for decontamination; and white zone = uncontaminated environment). For evaluation purposes, the disaster scene was divided into five observation zones referring to specific response activities. The observation zones did not necessarily overlap with the security zones.
Trained observers monitored the response activities and each movement between security zones. In order to facilitate the documentation, numbered stickers were used to label firefighters and victims. Independent observers, using video, monitored specific response activities (such as sample taking and containment and decontamination procedures) in order to clarify misinterpretations or conflicting documentation. For transparency reasons, all observers were instructed to record the exact time of an activity.The data collection templates were piloted during a radiation exercise in August 2006. The pilottesting was conducted to evaluate the documentation procedures, applicability of the templates, and positioning of the observers.The templates used included SOPs that are relevant for radiological, biological, and chemical exercises. After the piloting, SOPs specifically relevant for the management of released bio-hazardous agents were added.
Exercise Scenario
The local fire department of Norderstedt conducted a fullscale biohazard exercise in September 2006. Norderstedt has approximately 75,000 inhabitants and is part of a greater metropolitan area of Hamburg, Germany. The exercise took place near the center of the town in the area of an elementary school. The local firefighters are mainly auxiliary staff. Volunteers simulated the accident victims.
The exercise included: (1) prohibition of entrance to the area; (2) establishment of security zones; (3) evacuation of possibly contaminated pupils to an external area for decontamination (decon-area); (4) assessment of hazards related to suspicious material; (5) prevention of further dissemination; and (6) sampling and keeping the suspicious material in safe custody.The exercise did not include medical rescue.The firefighters knew that an exercise was planned, but received no information about the time of alarm or the type of hazard.
Data Processing
The documented activities were compared with the reference list of SOPs. The guidelines differ in some recommendations (Table 1) . 4, 5 Activities were considered as correct if (ZBS)) were established. The BBK introduced a researchbased, national preparedness plan including anti-epidemic measures, diagnostics, and vaccination and treatment strategies to guarantee adequate management of bioterrorist attacks. 2 Disaster preparedness is crucial for an adequate response. The BBK published a policy on the primary potential bioterrorist agents for use by healthcare professionals and police and fire departments-the groups that most likely will be confronted with bioterrorist attacks. 2 The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) and the Committee on Affairs of Fire Departments, Disaster Control and Civil Defense (Ausschuss für Feuerwehrangelegenheiten, Katastrophenschutz und zivile Verteidigung (AFKzV)) published guidelines on the management of released biohazardous agents (radiological, biological, and chemical) for fire departments and special hazardous materials response teams (HAZMAT teams). 4, 5 Klein et al categorizes disaster management exercises into three major types: (1) tabletop; (2) functional; and (3) fullscale. 6 A tabletop exercise typically is conducted in a room, without the involvement of outside parties. Functional exercises may involve multiple sites, and typically are conducted in the emergency operations center or its equivalent. The scope of activity includes more policies and coordination of personnel than usually are involved in a tabletop exercise. Full-scale exercises involve extensive amounts of resources and large numbers of personnel. The purpose of the exercises is to evaluate the responding organizations' operational capabilities in an interactive manner. The exercises are characterized by a high degree of realism typically including simulated incident scenes involving dummies of hazardous material and simulated victims. The utility of exercises using simulated incident scenes for improving the response performance has been reported by a limited number of publications. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Methods of monitoring and evaluation of response activities include: (1) a post-exercise self-assessment questionnaires for rescue workers; 7, 11 (2) post-exercise questionnaires filled out by simulated victims; 11 and (3) the use of trained, external observers. 11, 13 However, the methods used for documentation and evaluation usually are kept confidential.
Preparedness training must be evaluated by independent and trained observers to discover areas of ineffectiveness and to assure the quality of the responses. 6 A data collection instrument was developed to evaluate the performance of fire departments during public disaster exercises. The instrument aims to generate specific and constructive feedback on institutional and individual levels, which allows disaster coordinators to improve planning and training strategies. This report describes the rationale and first prospective application of the data collection instrument used to evaluate the response performance of a local fire department during a bioterrorism exercise.
Methods
In Germany, the RKI recommends the use of guidelines for the safe handling of suspicious agents during critical biohazardous incidents. 4 Fire service directives specify the response activities. 5 
Red Zone Black Zone
The active HAZMAT personnel wears full protective overalls including full masks and particle filters
The active HAZMAT personnel wears full protective overalls including full masks and particle filters The personnel did not perform all of the required SOPs during the exercise; the incident command explained that the following SOPs were not part of the training, but would have been performed in a real incident: (1) consideration of the wind direction; (2) coordination of further proceedings with appropriate law enforcement; (3) sending a sample of the substance to a laboratory; and (4) unclothing contaminated victims for decontamination
Discussion

The Exercise
The purpose of the exercise was to gain experience in managing an event involving a biohazardous substance. Most of the response activities were performed correctly. Nevertheless, lapses were identified. Possible reasons for discrepancies between the reference list of SOPs and performed response activities were: (1) problems due to incomplete available technical equipment; (2) insufficient training of required technical skills; (3) problems in communication or command structures; and (4) limiting factors of the exercise (e.g., exercise artificialities).
The personnel inadequately performed some procedures because of incomplete technical equipment (e.g., plastic tarp or enough containment boxes were not available). In these cases, the firefighters initially reacted in accordance to the recommendation, but improvised when needed equipment was lacking. The personnel inadequately performed specific activities such as the prevention of dissemination, decontamination, and disinfection. Sample taking of the suspicious substances was done too soon and without consultation with the incident command. These problems might be due to the fact that exercises or real incidents in this context are rare. The personnel performed some activities incompletely because of the limited timeframe (e.g., assembling of the suspicious material that was spread over a wide area). Other activities regarding the distress for the simulated victims (e.g., taking a decontamination shower) were not performed. However, the major problem was the incorrect assessment of the suspicious material. Hence, the personnel reacted as if it were a chemical accident. This could have severe consequences during a real biohazardous incident. This misinterpretation might be explained by the fact that training for biological biohazardous events has been rare so far. performed according to one of the guidelines. The technical performance of single procedures was not evaluated.
Data Collection and Analysis
Eighteen trained observers were located in six different observation zones. Two observers were assigned to the incident command. Four observers were assigned to the grey zone and four to the black zone. Two observers monitored each movement between the security zones. Two additional checkpoint observers were located at the entrance to the grey zone and near the decontamination area. Two independent observers monitored specific response activities (such as sample taking and containment and decontamination procedures) by video. The two authors (University of Hamburg) supervised the process. The documentation partially was not concordant. The observers resolved discrepancies in documentation by consensus and/or video recordings.
Results
The exercise began at 09:56 hours (h) and ended 11:47 h.The incident command terminated the exercise after the main response activities were completed. Sixty firefighters (including HAZMAT-personnel), eight members of the incident command, and 16 simulated victims participated. All 31 activities of the reference list of SOPs were assessed (Table 2) ; 20 were in accordance with the guidelines; 10 were performed incorrectly; one was not applicable (for details, see Table 2 ).
Problems related to the assessment and handling of the suspicious material, protective equipment, and decontamination were identified (Table 2); these included:
1. The personnel did not identify the suspicious substance correctly. It was treated as chemical, not as biological bio-hazardous; 2. Decontamination personnel performed the initial cleaning unprotected using brushes and water instead of using soap and disinfectant-saturated cloths; 3. The personnel did not adequately bind and cover the suspicious substance; a street drain near the substance remained uncovered; 4. The personnel did not place all protective overalls and other potentially contaminated objects in containment boxes; and 5. The personnel did not label all used containment boxes. It became apparent that, as with any exercise, there were a number of exercise artificialities. The high number of observers, their positioning, and the use of video cameras were believed to detract from the "reality" of the incident. Members of the senior management commented that some response activities were not overly ambitious because of the simulated conditions. Avoiding exercise artificiality seems to be crucial to avoid detracting from the lessons to be learned. This always should be considered when evaluating response performance.
Conclusions
Intensive training of responses to biohazardous incidents is necessary. Each fire department should perpetually reassess their technical equipment and specific skills as well as their communication and command structures.
Disaster responses should be target-orientated and require the consideration of several specific SOPs. Guidelines for disaster management are designed to guide response teams through complex and stressful situations. However, guidelines give planners a sense of security and
Data Collection and Analysis
The purpose of the documentation system was to provide specific and constructive feedback. The objective was to evaluate whether this system is adequate to identify discrepancies between performed response activities and current recommendations. As has been shown previously, using external observers provided transparent and independent data. 6 The positioning of the observers was adequate to monitor all key activities. In particular, the use of video cameras helped to resolve conflicting documentation.
Reasons for incomplete and/or conflicting documentation included: (1) insufficient training of observers; (2) imprecise instructions about what must be documented; and (3) large observation zones or not enough observers. Consequently, observers must be better trained. Observer training should include detailed written instructions and short guidelines that could be on-hand during an exercise or real-time event. The observers must be well-informed about guidelines and SOPs and should be precisely instructed about the case-specific situations to be observed.
The observation zones must not be too large. Fixed observation zones primarily were used in this study. An alternative could be to use mobile observation zones to adequately react on changing situations. However, mobile include simplification of structure and layout. Further research is needed. This evaluation system should be developed further in order to allow for the evaluation of exercises with the same or similar objectives. Furthermore, it should be evaluated whether the system can be applied to exercises with different objectives or according to different guidelines (e.g., large-scale operations during disasters caused by fire, chemical, nuclear, or natural hazards).
